Groundwater resource exploitations, as one of the most valuable water resources, cause conflicts among beneficiaries due to different priorities in decision-making processes. These conflicts lead beneficiaries to decide non-cooperatively. Consequently, it is essential to consider non-cooperative decision-making in order to manage groundwater resources properly. In this study, non-cooperative game theory was applied to groundwater resource management. This methodology was employed in Bad-Khaledabad study area located in the center of Iran. Also, quantity and quality simulation and optimization models were used to calculate the payoffs of beneficiaries including farmers and government. In order to understand beneficiaries’ non-cooperative decision-making, three games were examined called cropping pattern shift, efficiency improvement, and linked game. The stable solution obtained for the linked game was the scenario where farmers choose to change their cropping patterns which will increase the farmers’ profit by up to US$3,280,000, and government limits groundwater withdrawals to 66.5 MCM and pays for efficiency improvements which will raise the groundwater table 2m at the end of the fifth year.