Abstract
This study investigates the conflict resolution among different stakeholders in a water transfer project. The portion of the Beheshtabad Water Transfer Project in Iran which aims to convey water from the Karun Basin to the Gavkhuni Basin is used as a case study. In this process, the initial water allocation scheme is initially determined through simulation in MODSIM ignoring the water transfer project. Then, the concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative games are used to resolve the conflict among the stakeholders. The profits of water transfer project and the payoffs for each player are calculated using an optimization model that optimizes the allocation of the conveyed water. The results of the conflict resolution model show that bilateral cooperation is the best strategy the players may adopt. In the non-cooperative model, it is found that a water transfer agreement that is incentivized by an average payment of 250.66 million US$ as compensation from the Gavkhuni basin to the Karun basin puts both basins at equilibrium with a Pareto optimal condition; in this case, none of the players will be willing to abandon the cooperation without regret. In the cooperative approach, cooperation is found to be beneficial to all the players involved.
Keywords
- Water allocation
- Optimization
- Conflict resolution
- Game theory
- Incentive payment
- MODSIM model